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Abstract: This paper considers how Bryan Caplan’s concept of rational irra-
tionality may manifest in various political institutional arrangements, building
off the demand curve for irrationality. Mob democracy, anarchy, autocracy,
and constitutionally constrained democracy are the governance structures
addressed. While anarchy is strictly better than mob democracy, under certain
conditions, democracy, anarchy, or constitutionally constrained democracy
may yield the best outcomes depending on the circumstances.
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1 Introduction
Rational irrationality supplements rational ignorance in the standard public
choice perspective on government failure (Caplan 2001a). Rather than empha-
sizing the potential for self-interested actors to reach suboptimal outcomes in
political markets, rationally irrational voters are systematically biased in sev-
eral distinct ways. According to Caplan (2007a), these biases include Anti-
Market Bias, Antiforeign Bias, Make Work Bias, and Pessimism Bias. These
biases cause governments to make inappropriate interventions in the economy
and society. Rational irrationality may thereby explain inefficiencies observed
in policy today.1
*Corresponding author: Ryan H. Murphy, SMU Cox School of Business, O’Neil Center for Global
Markets and Freedom, Southern Methodist University, P.O. Box 750333, Dallas, TX 75275, USA,
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1 The purpose of this paper is not to re-examine the relative importance of rational irrationality
versus rational ignorance. The issue of the “miracle of aggregation” is a difficult one for
scholars arguing that rational ignorance is an important cause of bad public policy. However,
many still argue that it has a detrimental effect, e.g. Somin (2013).
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This paper seeks to construct a simple but fruitful model articulating how
rational irrationality may manifest in democracy, autocracy, and anarchy.2 It
does so by building on Caplan’s demand curve for irrationality. However, it
departs from Caplan regarding the shape of the demand curve. It instead
assumes that we should expect the demand curve to be shaped as economists
expect demand curves to be shaped generally, as in Murphy (forthcoming). This
leads to conditions wherein either anarchy or a constrained democracy mini-
mizes the quantity supplied of irrationality in society.
One precursor to this approach can be found in Taylor and Crampton (2009),
who find that meddlesome preferences (i.e., preferences over the behavior of
others) may be more or less expressed in democracies or in an anarchy depend-
ing on how these preferences are concentrated. The theory of expressive voting
(Brennan and Lomasky 1993), especially as it is thought of in terms of value-
expressive consumption (see Johar and Sirgy 1991) also shares relevance; the
desire to express beliefs (should it or should it not thought of as irrational)
underpins the idea, whether the desire is actualized in politics or on the market.
To make this argument, I will first establish the rationale for a traditional
demand curve in the market for irrationality. Then, I will compare how anarchy
and a simple model of democracy will respond to the presence of rational
irrationality. Finally, I will discuss the inherent tradeoffs between these forms
in governance in light of rational irrationality.
2 The Demand for Irrationality
The median voter systematically departs from the opinions of experts on issues
of policy. The departure is so great that the difference between the average
opinions of those on the two extremes of the political spectrum in the United
States is actually smaller than the difference between the average opinions of
economists versus non-economists (Caplan 2008). This demands explanation
and implies that, should economists understand the economy better than the
public, the median voter chooses inappropriate policies given the outcomes they
hope to achieve.
Caplan explains this in terms of a demand for irrationality. “Demand” for
irrationality can be interpreted as preferences over beliefs. It is painful to
change our minds, so individuals, whether voters or consumers, prefer not
2 I assume for the purposes of this paper that an anarchy would function as described by
Friedman (1989) or by Leeson (2014).
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to. As costs to holding false beliefs rise, they may cease holding the belief.
Caplan’s focus is a simple model he refers to as the “near-neoclassical demand
curve” for irrationality, as shown in Figure 1. Under this model, at prices
slightly higher than zero, no irrationality is demanded. When the price
approaches zero, however, it juts out significantly. This implies that, when
confronted with the real costs of their irrationalities on the market, consumers
behave rationally. But when voting, they satiate on their irrationalities because
they may do so costlessly.
Meanwhile, the “supply” side of irrationality – perhaps more intuitively, the
marginal cost of irrationality – changes interpretation in politics versus markets.
In politics, it is interpreted as the expected value of voting for a policy with
negative outcomes. In markets, the interpretation is the supply of goods and
services which are means-ends irrational. That does not imply overt fraud on the
part of the suppliers, but that the consumers have preferences for purchasing
certain goods that are inefficient or counterproductive in achieving their ends.
Murphy (forthcoming) contests that the near-neoclassical demand curve is
the best way of conceptualizing the demand for rational irrationality. He looks to
the psychological bases of rational irrationality in order to identify possible
examples of rational irrationality in the market, finding several. Some of these
were substantially costly. For example, under one estimation, the failure to
vaccinate children of three diseases – Whooping Cough, Invasive Pneumococcal
Disease, and Chicken Pox – corresponds to a willingness-to-pay of around
Figure 1: The near_neoclassical demand curve for irrationality.
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$8,000.3 Given these examples, it is more reasonable to posit a conventional
demand curve than the near-neoclassical demand curve for irrationality.
Murphy’s examples centered on those which expressed disapproval of mar-
kets, globalization, and science; in addition to failure to vaccinate were the
usage of local currencies, buying local for the stated reason of reducing carbon
emissions, and fair trade. However, in the absence of a government, these
impulses could arise in other ways.4 Private actions, especially (but not limited
to) those not presently legal, such as forcibly stopping trade or the entrance of
corporations to markets may be more pervasive and “effective” than in the
sometimes cumbersome political options, such as zoning laws.
The demand for irrationality manifests itself in a variety of ways in both
markets and politics. Under different institutional regimes, it will be supplied to
various degrees by firms and governments. If we believe that international trade
(for instance) is a net positive for society, and its rejection is due to both
ignorance and bias, then we should hope to curtail the irrationality regardless
of who is supplying it. While buying fair trade may be fundamentally less
coercive than voting for tariffs, the rational irrationality research agenda should
not be constrained to only economic examples in the public sphere.
3 Extending Caplan’s Model
In this section, I will show the implications of relaxing the assumption of near-
neoclassical demand for irrationality, and how that may play out within the frame-
work of the demand and supply of irrationality. In Figure 2, under democracy,
voters satiate at Q* level of irrationality. Under anarchy there will be zero irration-
ality, as firms charge a positive price to consumers. This is shown at Q**. Under this
model, an autocrat too would see significant costs arising from irrationality and
would abstain from any irrationality as well, which is perhaps a very strange result.
In Panel A of Figure 3, I present the level of irrationality under anarchy with a
conventional demand curve. This is simply a supply and a demand curve, with the
3 This estimate uses willingness-to-pay estimates to statistically avoid a one year illness, the
ratio of willingness-to-pay for an adult’s life versus that of their child’s, and differentials in the
chance one will get the disease between the vaccinated and unvaccinated in the United States.
4 The argument that whatever irrationalities that might occur in the absence of the government
would already occur in the presence of a government ignores the possibility that the govern-
ment may be currently crowding them out. If the government may crowd out “good” institutions
(as in Klein 1998), the government may crowd out bad institutions as well.
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quantity in the marketplace observed to be QA. In Panel B of Figure 3, I present the
level of irrationality under democracy. This requires significantly more explanation.
Caplan states that politicians, due to their education, may in fact be less
systematically biased than voters (2007a, 181). Their demand for irrationality
would therefore be less. Voters’ demand for irrationality is denoted DV and
politicians’ demand is denoted DP. (DV should be interpreted as being the
same demand curve as found in the overall demand for irrationality under
anarchy in Panel A.) Caplan’s findings elsewhere (2001b) in a multivariate
regression show that more education and gender correspond to beliefs close to
Figure 2: The market for irra-
tionality, with near-neoclassical
demand.
Figure 3: The market for irrationality, conventional demand curve.
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those of experts. Since Congress is more likely to be highly educated and more
likely to be male, we should expect the opinions of Congress to conform to those
of experts more than do the opinions of the voting public.
Under a strict theory of efficient democracy, politicians would be forced to
vote in concordance with DV . Though he argues its prevalence is small, Caplan
admits that opportunities for “wiggle room” or “slack” for politicians are also
opportunities for them to make the system more rational than voters would
prefer (Caplan 2010). While this would not hold under an efficient democracy
model, I assume that politicians get the policies collectively they want.
Secondly, we shouldn’t expect politicians to fully satiate on their irrationality,
which Caplan has also noted (2003, 233). Their voting may sometimes materially
impact the outcome. A vote in the Senate chamber only occasionally holds sway,
but when it does its impact is enormous, whereas the chance that a citizen’s vote
in a democracy holds sway can be rounded down to zero. Politicians therefore face
a supply curve, denoted SP. The corresponding equilibrium is QP. Additionally, the
mob rule or direct democracy equilibrium is denoted as QMR.
It is ambiguous whether QA is superior to QP. It would depend on the
costliness of supplying irrationality under anarchy and the differential between
the opinions of the elite versus the opinions of the ordinary voter. Given that
Caplan has argued forcefully that the elite have substantially better judgment
than the masses (2007b, 2012), perhaps the best answer to minimize irrationality
is to shield educated lawmakers from the excesses of the democratic process.
It should also be noted that there are also some real institutional restraints on
modern democracies that help politicians commit to better policies. Among these
are trade agreements, the rules governing the European Union, the dormant
Commerce Clause of the United States, and legal standards like Rational Basis
or Strict Scrutiny. In some sense these restraints allow politicians to collude to
provide better policies than the public wants. They may also be viewed as shifting
the supply curve of irrationality inward. Romanticism of the democratic process
notwithstanding, these barriers do in fact stop the democratic ideal from taking
place, and in doing so may prevent the median voter from choosing bad policies.
4 The Tradeoffs Between Anarchy, Democracy,
and Autocracy
The previous section provided a basic model for conceptualizing the supply and
demand of irrationality in government and in markets. To fully evaluate rational
irrationality across political institutional arrangements, I give a unified, though
6 R. H. Murphy
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simple, model of the levels of irrationality and variance of outcomes within anar-
chy, democracy, and autocracy. This model does not directly connect with Caplan’s
model found in Section 3, but the interpretation of the supply and demand of
irrationality in markets versus governments informs the formation of the model.
Systems of governments are viewed on a continuous scale in the limits they
place on democracy, as shown in Figure 4 (this scale is in part inspired by the
Polity IV index [Marshall and Cole 2011]) At one extreme is mob (direct) democ-
racy; at the other is autocracy. Between them are constitutional democracy and
anocracy, which each place limits on the mob.5 All governments fall somewhere
on this scale, with anarchy completely off of it. United States and Singapore are
listed for illustrative purposes.
Autocracies, on average,may reduce irrationality at the expense of higher variation in
outcomes. Higher variance among autocracies is a widespread finding (e.g. Rodrick
2000; Almeida and Ferreira 2002; Easterly 2011). Modeling the primary problem with
autocracy as variance of outcomes also corresponds clearly to what Francis
Fukuyama calls the “bad emperor problem” (2011): even upon making every effort
to choose and groom a new autocrat, a bad one can be disastrous. This tradeoff is
made explicit in Figure 5. As this tradeoff is between two bads, Figure 5 should be
interpreted as an inverted productionpossibilities frontier. Anypoint on the outside of
the “PPF” is attainable for a government, and any point on the inside is unattainable.
It may seem odd to assume that autocracies will perform better than democracies
on average. But while democracy is generally linked to growth (as in, among many
others, Acemoglu and Robinson 2012), others have argued at times it works to the
contrary (Zakaria 2003; Collier 2010). Moreover, what is meant here by limiting
democracy is not what is meant in the standard measures of democracy, for instance
the Freedom House and Polity IV indexes (Freedom House 2014; Marshall and Cole
2011). These indexes do not meaningfully draw distinctions between mob democracy
and constitutional democracy. The United States government, for instance, scores as
extremely democratic. As defined herein, the United States has numerous restrictions
on democracy to prevent mob rule. As long as there is some correlation between the
checks on democracy and the policies favored by the elite, this assumption holds.
5 Although this is clearly not the case generally, anocracy will be treated as simply a more
extreme constitutional democracy.
Figure 4: The spectrum of governments.
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To motivate this further, consider the following. The median voter in the
democracy may have biased beliefs, but the median still typically wants economic
growth and to avoid famines. Autocrats are chosen somewhere on the distribution
of beliefs, but subsequently feel the costs and benefits of their policy decisions.
Since the person can be anywhere on the distribution, a Hitler is free to pursue
very bad policies. However, someone with a more orthodox worldview may make
better decisions than the mob decisions. Autocratic characteristics thereby yield
more variance but higher expected value.
I also wish to emphasize that this model is not intended to capture all
avenues by which political institutions may impact the variance of outcomes,
only on the margin of rational irrationality. The pure direct democracy acts in
accordance to the median voter, whatever that may mean and however capricious
the median voter may be. The voters may be arbitrary and I am not arguing that
the literal variance of outcomes over time for mob democracies would be zero.
What I intend is that, within the scope of the model, the source of variance is the
departure of policy from the choices of the median voter. Constitutional limits on
democracy or autocratic elements introduce these departures.
Checks on democracy through other mechanisms may reduce variance in
other senses, e.g. by forming a check on median voter caprice. But if that check
relies on specific actors within the government, it introduces variance in the
sense the model intends to address. Placing the decision in the hands of a small
group instead of the voting public gives greater incentive for the decision to be
made rationally, but also introduces the risk that the group holds an unortho-
dox, dangerous worldview.
Figure 5: The constitu-
tional trade-off.
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Let the representative individual have a mean-variance utility function of
the form U = x − aσ, where x represents wealth and σ is the standard deviation of
outcomes. The parameter a is strictly positive weighting variable. Assume that
all variance in political outcomes is the result of restraining democracy.
Mob democracy is assumed to have zero variance of outcomes and a set
(non-optimal) level of wealth, xM .
Mob Democracy
x = xM
σ = σM =0
Autocracies, at the other extreme, may confer a higher or lower level of wealth.
These are represented by xH and xL, respectively. The autocratic government will
confer xH with probability ρ and will confer xL with probability 1− ρð Þ. These
levels of wealth relate to each other and mob democracy such that
xH > xM > xL
Autocracies confer, in the expected sense, a level of wealth xA.
Autocracy
x = xA = ρxH + 1− ρð ÞxL
This standard deviation in outcomes is denoted σA
σ = σA =
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ρ xH − ρxH + 1− ρð ÞxLð Þð Þ2 + 1− ρð Þ xL − ρxH + 1− ρð ÞxLð Þð Þ2
q
Finally, between mob rule and autocracy are constrained democracies, mod-
eled as weighted averages of the two outcomes. Governments are constrained
institutionally by the choice variable γ : 0, 1½ . This allows societies to move
along the constitutional tradeoff in Figure 5. To capture the diminishing
returns to relinquishing democratic power to politicians, there are also weight-
ing functions wH γð Þ and wL γð Þ. This is to reflect that the best checks on
democratic power, such as trade agreements or the dormant Commerce
Clause, may be put in place with little totalitarian threat. Let wealth conferred
by constrained constitutional democracy be denoted by xC and its dispersion in
outcomes as σC.
Constrained Democracy
x = xC = 1− γð ÞxM + γ wH γð ÞρxH +wL γð Þ 1− ρð ÞxLð Þ
σ = σC =
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ρ 1− γð ÞxM + γ wH γð ÞxHð Þ− xCð Þ2 + 1− ρð Þ 1− γð ÞxM + γ wL γð ÞxLð Þ − xCð Þ2
q
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U = xC γð Þ− aσC γð Þ
The γ corresponding to the maximal point offers the best possible variance/
irrationality mix for a government.
The last form of governance is anarchy. Assume that its variance in out-
comes is zero on this particular margin. Let it be denoted as xAC and its standard
deviation of outcomes as σAC. Analytically we can assume that irrationality
under anarchy is less prevalent than under mob democracy, as in the former,
consumers feel the costs of their irrationality.
Anarchy
x = xAC > xM
σ = σAC =0




Figure 6 illustrates one possible outcome. The constitutional tradeoff outlines
what is analogous to an inverted production possibilities frontier, as both
variance and irrationality are bads. Indifference curves are also inverted;
what is optimal is zero variance and irrationality, so the best point on the
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feasible). In this example, the best government is a roughly equal mix of
democracy and autocracy. Anarchy is superior to some forms of democracy,
but not all. However, it is also possible that anarchy is superior to the optimal
government.
I should note that I do not object to concerns regarding the conceptual
legitimacy of aspects of Figure 6. For instance, the indifference curve does not
represent the indifference curve of any individual, even the “representative”
individual in society. It instead is in reference to an idealized social planner who
paternalistically wishes to minimize some function of the irrationality of the
citizens and the variance in outcomes resulting from the movement away from
the democratic process. However, all of this is implicit in the concept of rational
irrationality if we treat it symmetrically in markets and politics. Something like
this model is necessary should we want to maintain that symmetry. Rational
irrationality cannot be generalized without conceiving of these issues from the
viewpoint of the idealized paternalistic social planner.
5 Conclusion
Rational irrationality may lead to poor policy outcomes in democracies, and they
will be the poorest in mob democracies. In practice, democracies are constrained,
whether constitutionally or by taking on elements of autocracy. These constraints
may on average reduce irrationality, but at the expense of increasing the variance of
outcomes. The mix of irrationality and variance that these governments produce
may be better or worse than what would be achieved under a functioning anarchy.
In the United States, there is good reason to believe that politicians are more
rational than the voting public. The presence of rational irrationality has quite
ambiguous effects on the ways in which we should view the relative efficacy of
different institutional arrangements, though perhaps it gives yet another reason to
be skeptical of the workability of arrangements like direct democracy.
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